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Rashidun army – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:

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When the army was on the march, it always halted on Fridays. When on march, the day’s march was never allowed to be so long as to tire out the troops. The stages were selected with reference to the availability of water and other provisions. One remarkable feature of the movement of this great army was that it was independent of lines of communication. Behind it stretched no line of supply, since it had no logistical base. This army could not be cut off from its supplies, for it had no supply depots, Under the Army Department, there was a separate Commissariat Department. All the food stores were collected at one place and trotted along with the army. It needed no roads for its movement, for it had no wagons and everything was carried on camels. Thus this army could go anywhere and traverse any terrain so long as there was a path over which men and animals could move. This ease of movement gave the Muslims a tremendous edge on the Romans and Persians in mobility and speed. When on march, this army moved like a caravan and gave the impression of an undrilled horde; from the point of view of military security it was virtually invulnerable. The advance was led by an advance guard consisting of a regiment or more. Then came the main body of the army, and this was followed by the women and children and the baggage loaded on camels. At the end of the column moved the rear guard. On long marches the horses were led; but if there was any danger of enemy interference on the march, the horses were mounted, and the cavalry thus formed would act either as the advance guard or the rearguard or move wide on a flank, depending on the direction from which the greatest danger threatened. In case of need, the entire army could vanish in an hour or so and be safe at a distance beyond terrain which no other large army could traverse.

Another remarkable strategy developed by Khalid and later followed by others generals, was of not moving far from the desert so long as there were opposing forces within striking distance of its rear and its route to the desert. To fight the battles close to the desert, with their routes to the desert open in case they would suffer a defeat, the desert was behind them and could provide safe route to retreat in possible defeat.^[13] The desert was not only a haven of security into which the Sassanid army and Byzantine army would not venture but also a region of free, fast movement in which their camel mounted troops could move easily and rapidly to any objective that they chose. Following this same strategy during the conquest of Iraq and of Syria, Khalid ibn Walid did not engage his army deep into Iraq and Syria until the opposing army had lost its ability to threaten his routes to the desert. Another possible advantage of always keeping desert at the rear, was of communication with the Caliph at Medina and making it easy for him to sent messengers and reinforcement.